Abstract. We show that the basic properties of Robinson's infinite forcing companions are naturally transmitted to the so called n-infinite forcing companions and start with the examination of mutual relations of n-infinite forcing companions of Peano arithmetic.
Preliminaries
Throughout the article L is a first order language. In general discussions mostly it is irrelevant whether it is with equality or not; however, in some cases, for instance when it comes to finite models, the supposition of the existence of the equality relation could be of significance -see 2.6.
For a theory T of the language L, µ(T ) will be the slass of all its models (as usual, by a theory we assume a consistent deductively closed set of sentences -thus, T ϕ means ϕ ∈ T ). By Σ n -formula we mean any formula equivalent to a formula in prenex normal form whose prenex consists of n blocks of quantifiers, the first one is the block of existential quantifiers (Π n -formulas are defined analoguosly). The models (of the language L) will be denote by A, B . . ., while their domains will be A, B, . . .. For a model A, Diag n (A) is the set of all Σ n -, Π n -senteneces of the language L(A) (the simple expansion of the language L obtained by adding a new set of constants which is in one to one correspendence with domain A) which hold in A. In particular, for n = 0, Diag 0 (A) is not the diagram of A in the sense in which it is used in model theory, but this difference is of no importance for the text (the same situation we had when we were dealing with the generalization of finite forcing). As usual, we will not distinguish an element a from A and to it the corresponding constant. If A is a submodel of B and (B, a) a∈A Diag n (A), we say that A is an n-elementary submodel of B (i.e., that B is an n-elementary extension of A), in notation A ≺ n B. In general, A is n-embedded in B if for some embedding f of A into B, f (A) is an n-elementary submodel of B. A Σ n+1 -chain of models is a chain of models A 0 < A 1 < · · · < A α < · · · , α < γ, where for each GRULOVIĆ α < β (< γ), A α is an n-elementary submodel of A β ; we use A < B to denote that A is a submodel of B, therefore < is "equal" to ≺ 0 .
The definition of n-infinite forcing follows the definition of (Robinson's) infinite forcing with the exception of the the case of "negation". So if K is a class of models of the language L, A its element and ϕ a sentence of the language L(A), we say that A n-infinitely forces ¬ϕ (with respect to the class K), in notation A n ϕ, iff no n-elementary extension of A n-infinitely forces ϕ. A model A from K is n-infinitely generic iff for any sentence ϕ of the language L(A) either A n ϕ or A n ¬ϕ.
On condition that K is n-inductive, i.e., closed under unions of Σ n+1 -chains, it holds: For the readers who are not willing to bother themselves by recalling the basic facts from the theory of infinite forcing the proof of these (and some other) analogies of the corresponding assertions of n-infinite forcing are given in [9] .
n-infinite forcing companion
Definition 2.1. For a given theory T of the language L let L n T be the subclass of the n-infinitely generic models of the class µ(T ∩Π n+1 ). Then the theory Th(L n T ) is called the n-infinite forcing companion of the theory T and is denoted by T Fn . The theory T is n-infinite forcing complete iff T = T Fn .
Lemma 2.2. (a) If a (first-order) theory T of the language L has the n-model
, where E n T is the class of n-existentially complete models of the theory T ;
generalized elementary class, then so is the other and in that case these classes have the same theory (Th(E
) which is the n-model companion of the theory T . Proof. We recall that in the case it exists, the n-model companion of the theory T is the theory which is n-mutually-consistent with T and n-model complete.
(a) It is known that E n T = µ(T * ) (see [9] , [10] ). Thus, E n T is n-model complete and, by 1.2(b) and (1)
Fn is a complete theory iff T has the n-joint embedding property [8] ;
The other inclusion follows from 1.1; if ϕ is Π n+1 -sentence which is not a consequence of T , then for some model A of T , A ¬ϕ, and if the an n-infinitely generic model B is an n-elementary extension of A, it follows B ¬ϕ, whence ϕ ∈ T Fn .
(3) By the previous items we have:
(4) An immediate consequence of (1) and (2). (5) Suppose that T has the n-joint embedding property but that T Fn is not complete. Then, for some sentence ϕ of the language L and some n-infinitely generic models A and B, A ϕ and B ¬ϕ. Let A 1 and B 1 be models of T , which are, respectively, n-elementary extensions of A and B (such models exist since A, B ∈ µ(T ∩ Π n+1 )). Let futher C be a model of T into which the models A 1 and B 1 are n-embedded and let D be an n-infinitely generic model which is an n-extension of C. Then A and B are elementary embedded into D, hence D satisfies both ϕ and ¬ϕ, a contradiction. The other implication is also obvious; we use the facts that any complete theory has the n-joint embedding property and that L n T is n-model consistent with µ(T ∩ Π n+1 ). 
Proof.
Trivial. There is some n-infinitely generic model B which is also an n-elementary extension of A. By condition of the lemma, A is an elementary submodel of B, thus itself an n-infinitely generic model. Corollary 2.6. Let T be a theory defined in the language (L) with equality and with finite models. Then any its finite model is n-infinitely generic for any n 1.
Proof. Let A be a finite model of T . By a Π 1 -sentence from Diag 1 (A) we can say that A has exactly |A| elements, so the only n-elementary extension of A (for n 1) is A itself.
Corollary 2.7. (a) If T is an n-inductive theory and for each sentence ϕ consistent with T there exists a model of T ∪ {ϕ} which n-completes T , then T is n-infinite forcing complete. (b) Any n-model complete theory is n-infinite forcing complete and, in fact, it is its own n-model completion.

Proof. (a) By 2.3(6), T ⊆ T
Fn . Suppose ϕ ∈ T . Then, by the condition of the corollary, there exists a model A of T ∪ {¬ϕ} which n-completes T and thus it is n-infinitely generic. It follows that ϕ is not in T Fn .
Part (b) is a direct consequence of (a) and the uniqueness of n-companion operator. 
Proof. (a) By induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ. Obviously, only the case ϕ ≡ ¬ψ is of some interest. Suppose B n ϕ, but not (B, a)
A n ψ, whence, by inductive hypothesis, C n ψ. But, because of B ≺ n C, C n-infinitely forces ¬ψ as well, a contradiction. The inverse implication is clear too.
( (B, a) ¬ϕ, i.e. (B, a) A n ¬ϕ. Hence, , a) 
) -the complete diagram of A (a is still an enumeration of the elements of A).
Proof. Directly, by 1.2(a) and the previous lemma (again the item (a) ).
The next two propositions have the equivalents in the theory of n-finite forcing (see [7] ) and the proofs of the equivalent assertions are based on the same factsfor they are direct consequences of Theorem 2.3 which has the analogy in n-finite forcing. (b) It is known that Peano arithmetic does not have the joint embedding property (see [11] , or, for more details [14] , [15] , [16] ).
(c) Due to (one) Gödel's result, for any subtheory T of Th(N) with an effectively recursively enumerable set of axioms there exists an universal sentence which is satisfied in N but does not belong to T . Let us take for T the Π 2 -segment of Peano arithmetic and let ϕ be an universal sentence from Th(N) which is not in T P A ∩ Π 2 . If we supposed that N is an infinitely generic model, then, by 1.2(a), it would follow that ϕ ∈ T [17] ). This example shows that in general the condition in Lemma 2.5 cannot be weakened: T ∪ Diag n (A) is complete does not necessarily imply that A is n-infinitely generic (but it implies that A is n-finitely generic model -see the proof of Theorem 4.9 in [1] and Theorem 0.1 in [7] ). By 2.5 and 2.3(6), any finite model in the theory with equality and with finite models, which includes a lot of interesting theories -groups, rings, fields and so on, is both 1-finitely and 1-infinitely generic model and, surely, in the cases of mentioned theories it is neither finitely nor infinitely generic model. Thus for these theories the intersection of the classes of 1-finitely and 1-infinitely generic models is nonempty. However, the classes of finitely and infinitely generic models can be disjoint, for instance in the case of groups [13, Theorem 11] , commutative rings with identity [3, Theorem 61] etc. It follows that for these theories infinite and 1-infinite forcing companions do not coincide (the first one contains the sentences which provide the existence of infinitely many elements). Of course, in the case the theory has the joint embedding property, but not the 1-joint embedding property we obtain immediately that the infinite forcing companion is complete, while the 1-infinite forcing companion is not complete.
